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The	assessment	of	the	balance	of	risks	to	the	stability	of	the	Spanish	financial	
system	has	worsened	somewhat	in	the	past	six	months	owing,	in	particular,	
to	the	downward	revision	of	the	global	economic	outlook.	Since the publication 
of the last Financial Stability Report (FSR), growth projections have been scaled 
down in most economies. Indeed, the increase in global GDP this year is expected 
to be the lowest since the international financial crisis. Moreover, the balance 
of risks to this growth is tilted to the downside. This flatter economic activity 
may have implications both for financial and real asset valuations and for 
agents’ decisions. 
Against this background, the main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish 
financial system are the following (Table 1):
1	 	Global	 economic	 slowdown	 and	 geopolitical	 uncertainty.	
One of the factors of risk identified in the previous FSR, relating 
to the slowdown in global economic activity, has already begun to 
materialise. A good number of the high-frequency conjunctural 
indicators are showing signs of substantial weakness, foretelling 
the entry into technical recession of some large economies and 
giving rise to a downward revision of growth forecasts. 
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RISK FACTORS (a)
Table 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The risks which appear in this table are calibrated using three colours: yellow indicates low risk, orange, medium risk, and red, high risk. Consequently, 
at present the three risks are at a medium level. The time horizon for which these risks are defined is set by the FSR's frequency, i.e. half-yearly. For 
each risk level, the arrows indicate whether risk has recently increased, held stable or diminished. Reclassification compared with a previous FSR of 
a risk factor to a different level (change of colour) involves posting a stable-trending arrow.
1 Global economic slowdown and geopolitical uncertainty. The economic slowdown 
is affecting Europe and the emerging economies more sharply and, along with high geopolitical 
uncertainty, might entail an increase in risk premia that reduces the value of financial assets. 
Moreover, it might also weigh down agents’ income and raise their projected debt levels, 
thereby leading to revised consumption and investment plans.
2 Low profitability of financial institutions. Financial institutions’ profitability will be under 
additional pressure owing to the economic slowdown and, therefore, to the prospect that interest 
rates may hold at very low and even negative levels for longer than expected.
3 Legal risk. Spanish deposit institutions face, with varying degrees of intensity, a legal risk arising 
from the potential consequences of the outcomes of legal demands against them.
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The revision of economic activity forecasts is across the board, 
but it has particularly impacted Europe, where Germany’s export 
sector is showing notable weakness, and the emerging economies 
(Chart 1). Spain has also been affected by these downward 
revisions to the growth outlook (Chart 2). 
Global geopolitical uncertainty remains high and is also starting to 
weigh on agents’ decisions, especially those requiring a longer 
timeframe for realisation, such as investment. 
The causes of this geopolitical uncertainty remain largely in place, 
and those that have disappeared have been replaced by other, 
fresh sources. Firstly, the US-China trade tensions continue, 
SOURCES: Thomson Reuters Datastream, Consensus, INE and Banco de España.
a Average of 3-month volatilities for USD/EUR, USD/GBP and JPY/USD.
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19
S&P 500 EUROSTOXX 50
IBEX 35 MSCI EMERGING
4  STOCK MARKET INDICES
31 Dec 2018 = 100
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan-19 Mar-19 May-19 Jul-19 Sep-19
S&P EUROSTOXX
EXCHANGE RATES (a) US BONDS (right-hand scale)
3  VOLATILITIES
% bp
6.0
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19
UNITED STATES JAPAN
UNITED KINGDOM EURO AREA
CHINA (right-hand scale)
1  CONSENSUS FORECASTS FOR 2019
% y-o-y % y-o-y
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
OBSERVED QUARTER-ON-QUARTER
OBSERVED YEAR-ON-YEAR
BANCO DE ESPAÑA SEPTEMBER 2019 PROJECTIONS
%
2  SPAIN. CHANGE IN GDP
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, AUTUMN 2019  MAIN RISKS TO THE STABILITY OF THE SPANISH FINANCIAL SYSTEM
a major cause of which is leadership in technological sectors. 
Further, the maximum tariffs that can be applied to certain products 
are being revised, potentially affecting US-European trade relations. 
Secondly, the risk of a no-deal Brexit still persits, despite the 
additional prorogue approved by the European Council. Tensions 
in the Middle East also seem to be intensifying. Conversely, the 
forming of a new government in Italy in September should 
contribute to stabilising the country’s fiscal situation. Finally, in 
Spain, a new government could not be formed following the last 
elections; accordingly, fresh elections have been called for 10 
November, prolonging the uncertainty over economic policy 
formulation. Further compounding this has been the impact of the 
latest developments in Catalonia.
To date, the international financial markets’ reaction to the rise in 
global uncertainty has been contained, and has not taken the form 
of higher risk premia and lower asset prices (Charts 3 and 4). This 
has, partly, been the result of the resolute action by many central 
banks, which eased monetary conditions even further in the face 
of the scant convergence of inflation towards its objective and/or 
the implications of global developments for the growth outlook. 
In the euro area, monetary accommodation has been accompanied 
by additional measures to smooth bank funding (new more 
favourable conditions in the new series of quarterly refinancing 
operations, namely TLTRO III) and to mitigate the impact on 
profitability (a two-tier system for the remuneration of the reserves 
banks hold at the central bank). 
In this respect, the economic slowdown and the potential 
materialisation of geopolitical risks might have adverse effects on 
financial stability through various channels. First, agents might 
be led to reassess their perception of risk, prompting a rise in the 
associated premia that could cause an acute and lasting adjustment 
in the prices of the financial assets affected, giving rise to losses in 
all agents’ portfolios, including deposit institutions. Second, 
households’ and non-financial corporations’ income flows would 
decline, through lower employment creation and an easing in wage 
earnings (households) and a reduction in profits (companies). This 
means that the debt levels of both groups of agents might ultimately 
be higher than expected, with a further negative impact on future 
consumption and investment. Through this channel, which will 
gain in significance if the adverse situation persists over time, 
financial intermediaries’ activity would also be affected, essentially 
the quality of their assets and the demand for financial services, 
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including credit. As a result, deposit institutions would encounter 
greater difficulties in further strengthening their balance sheets 
and, potentially, their solvency might worsen. 
2	 	Low	profitability	of	financial	institutions. In the first half of 2019 
Spanish deposit institutions saw their consolidated net income fall 
by around 11% compared with the same period a year earlier. A 
more detailed analysis shows that much of the decline is due to 
the lower gains on financial assets and to the increase in 
extraordinary operating expenses, meaning that recurrent 
operating income did not decline so much. Moreover, net interest 
income increased slightly (Chart 5). Indeed, the level of profitability 
observed in June 2019 is one of the highest of the post-crisis 
period, above the European average, although it has still not 
exceeded the cost of equity (COE).
Looking ahead, the downward revision of the growth and inflation 
outlook and, as a result, the stronger prospect that interest rates 
will hold for longer at very low or even negative levels, will pose a 
notable challenge for the recovery of profitability levels in step with 
the COE. In fact, the markets have in recent months lowered their 
expectations about banks’ profit growth. 
Lower profitability hampers the organic generation of capital. 
However, institutions have slightly raised their top-quality 
capital ratios in the recent period, reversing the downward trend 
of the past two years. Moreover, the stress tests conducted by the 
Banco de España suggest that their resilience in the face of 
the risks identified materialising has increased and is appropriate 
at the aggregate level. In any event, while largely exceeding 
regulatory requirements, the relatively low ranking of Spanish 
institutions Europe-wide and the future roll-out of the last part of 
the Basel III reforms advise further perseverance in their shoring 
up of solvency. 
On the favourable side, the lower cost of financing that the context 
of very low interest rates entails will contribute to facilitating 
deposit institutions’ issuance of eligible liabilities to comply with 
the MREL (minimum requirement for own funds and eligible 
liabilities), which is designed to avoid the use of public funds in the 
resolution of non-viable institutions. 
The risks around profitability do not only affect the income 
statements of deposit institutions but also those of other financial 
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institutions, such as investment and pension funds and insurance 
companies, which have gained in importance in the financial sector 
post-crisis (Chart 6). This is especially so when these institutions 
guarantee a specific profitability for their customers and also if their 
operational funding requirements are not sufficiently covered. 
Against this background, financial intermediaries may have 
incentives to offset the low profitability of their normal business 
with greater risk-taking; accordingly, greater watchfulness will be 
required to prevent the build-up of systemic risks. 
3  Legal risk. As noted in the previous FSR, the cost for Spanish 
deposit institutions of legal processes relating to certain mortgage 
agreement clauses has been high. And, at the same time, other 
significant legal processes are still to be resolved. In particular, 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is expected 
in the coming months to unveil its response to the pre-trial 
questions raised in relation to the use of the mortgage loan 
benchmark index (IRPH by its Spanish abbreviation). 
In this setting, banks should continue to strive to provide their 
customers with financial products suited to their needs and 
capacities, and to furnish the relevant information on their products 
and services clearly and transparently. The recent regulatory 
changes in the mortgage market might help further this objective. 
It should be borne in mind that reputation and customer confidence 
are essential factors for developing banking business. 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Inverco and CNMV.
a The red (green) colour of the bars indicates a negative (positive) contribution by the related item to the change in the consolidated result for June 
2019 compared with June 2018.
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This	 FSR	 includes	 additional	 elements	 of	 analysis	 related	 to	 the	 risks	 to	
financial	stability.	 In particular, it analyses potential factors of vulnerability, such 
as the level of debt and the financial position of the non-financial private sector and 
of the public sector. It further looks at developments in the real estate market, 
solvency and liquidity stress tests for the banking sector and systemic risk indicators. 
Lastly, it describes the macroprudential policy stance, which is the main tool for 
mitigating the potential impact of the risks identified.   
Non-financial	 private	 sector	 debt	 ratios	 have	 continued	 to	 decline,	 standing	
below	average	euro	area	levels. Indeed, the non-financial private sector debt ratio 
relative to GDP stood at 132%, 5 pp down on a year earlier and 4 pp below the euro area 
average. This deleveraging process has been generalised across both households 
and firms, although in both sectors there continue to be vulnerable groups with high 
levels of debt. In this respect, consumer credit grew in June 2019 at a year-on-year 
rate of around 12%, and non-performing consumer loans at 26%, raising the 
NPL ratio slightly to 5.6% (Chart 7). 
In the real estate sector, lending standards for household loans broadly continue to 
be prudent and the indicators of activity appear to be showing signs of slowing. 
However, prices continue to grow at a high pace (Chart 8), meaning its future course 
will require continued monitoring. 
Public sector debt is holding at a high level and the Spanish economy’s net 
international investment position remains significantly negative. That is a source of 
vulnerability ahead of any future changes in sentiment on international financial 
markets or of a downturn in the macroeconomic situation. 
The	stress	tests	conducted	by	the	Banco	de	España	this	year	on	the	banking	
sector	 show	 adequate	 resilience	 at	 the	 aggregate	 level.	 The adverse 
SOURCES: Banco de España and INE.
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macroeconomic scenario used on this occasion for the stress tests involves a 
slight increase in severity relative to the test the previous year. Notwithstanding, the 
reduction in banks’ capital (Chart 9) is somewhat less than in 2018. This 
is essentially due to the fact that the institutions’ opening balance sheets are in a 
better position, with lower NPL ratios and a lower volume of foreclosed assets. In 
the adverse scenario the exercise also shows limited capacity on the part of the 
banks to generate operating income and significant deleveraging. On this occasion 
there was an additional sensitivity test under the adverse scenario, subjecting the 
sovereign exposures at amortised cost (i.e. not subject to changes in valuation 
based on market price developments) to the same stress as the sovereign exposures 
at fair value (Chart 10). Capital consumption in this case increases substantially, 
revealing the significance of the risk associated with the decline in the valuation 
of certain assets.     
The	 Banco	 de	 España	 has	 kept	 its	 macroprudential	 policy	 stance	 towards	
systemic	risks	unchanged.	The analysis set out in the FSR endorses holding the 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) at 0%. However, under the baseline projection 
scenario several benchmark indicators would exceed the activation thresholds in 
the first half of 2021. Were this macroprudential instrument activated, the credit 
institutions affected would have 12 months in which to comply with the requirement. 
Nonetheless, this diagnosis is conditional on there being no deviations from the 
baseline projections scenario. At present there are numerous factors of downside 
risk (possibility of a no-deal Brexit, the stepping up of trade tensions and a delay in 
the resumption of economic growth in the euro area). Their potential materialisation 
would involve a change in this assessment.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The percentage of the sovereign exposure classified in portfolios under the amortised cost criterion (i.e. which is not classified under the fair value 
criterion) is, for December 2018, presented for each group of institutions, as is the sovereign exposure/total assets ratio. For the 2019-2021 horizon, 
the chart depicts the additional consumption expressed in pp of the CET1 ratio that would arise under the adverse scenario were the sovereign 
exposure under the amortised cost criterion to be reclassified under the fair value criterion.
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